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Introduction
The Republic of Korea’s rapid transformation from a poverty-stricken and 
war-ravaged nation to the 12th largest economy in the world and an aid donor 
represents a significant transformation. Korea’s annual real GDP growth 
averaged 7.3 percent between 1960 and 2019.1 
While this growth began in Korea’s major cities, it was accompanied by 
rapid reductions in rural poverty.2 One of the most high-profile programs 
contributing to this reduction in poverty was the New Village Movement (or 
New Community Movement; in Korean, Saemaul Undong, or SMU),launched by 
the administration of then-president Chung Hee Park in 1972. This community 
development program was intended to encourage an attitude of “self-help” 
and mobilize citizens in associations to undertake self-directed projects. The 
Ministry of Home Affairs implemented the program, with provincial and county 
(gun) authorities tasked with overseeing and supporting the village projects. Yet 
villages were responsible for choosing their own projects and for putting them 
into place—an arrangement sometimes characterized as “top-down and bottom-
up.”3 This case study focuses on the implementation of the SMU in rural areas, 
where villages were encouraged to take a significant active role, as a collective, 
in their own processes of locally driven development.4 In particular, it focuses 
on how the SMU catalyzed increased participation of women in this program.
1 World Bank, Republic of Korea Overview. Accessed September 28, 2020. http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/
korea/overview  
2 Han 2012. Some analysts have referred to this as a “rural development miracle” (Douglass 2013). 
3 See Park 2009.
4 Some scholars note that the rural focus of the SMU has been over-emphasized, and it is of course worth noting 
that the SMU was also implemented in Korea’s cities, where the focus was on somewhat different types of projects.
Catalyzing Women’s Leadership and 
Participation in Rural Development: The 
Case of Saemaul Women’s Associations 





Poverty reduction; rural development; 
women’s empowerment
DELIVERY CHALLENGES:
Social and Cultural: Gender; Leadership 
and Commitment: Opposition and Lack 

















Rural Development and 
Women’s Empowerment  ..... 2
Delivery Challenges .............. 3
Implementation: Top-Down 
and Bottom-Up ..................... 4
Addressing Delivery 
Challenges  ........................... 7
Reflecting on Results (Short- 
and Long-term) and Lessons 
from the SWA Experience   .. 9
References .......................... 12
This case study was prepared by Jacob 
Bathanti and Kyoungeun Choi, based on 
interviews and archival research carried 
out by Kyoungeun Choi. The authors 
appreciate the assistance of Jisun Kim in 
facilitating fieldwork. They are also grateful 
to the interviewees and in particular the 
veteran participants of the Saemaul Undong 
movement who generously shared their time 
and experiences. Tristan Dreisbach, Debra 
Ladner, Min Young Seo, and Catalina Vallejo 
provided thoughtful feedback on various 
drafts and aspects of the case study.
2
GLOBAL DELIVERY INITIATIVE
In rural areas, Saemaul Undong operated as a 
“community conditional cash transfer” program. 
5Villages involved in the program had broad leeway to 
create their own programs, with some material inputs 
from the government (e.g., cement for infrastructure 
projects), but with considerable focus on mobilizing 
local resources and achieving local self-sufficiency. After 
an initial period in which inputs, including funds, were 
provided to all villages, only villages that were evaluated 
as “self-reliant”—achieving significant gains in improving 
infrastructure and launching income-generating 
projects—received further funding. 
One important aspect of the Saemaul Undong was its 
encouragement of women’s leadership in village projects. 
In 1973, the Saemaul Women’s Association (SWA) was 
established as a branch organization of the Saemaul 
Undong. After the establishment of the SWA, each village 
had one male and one female Saemaul leader, who were 
tasked with organizing village members to undertake a 
variety of local development projects—ranging from 
reforestation and building small bridges to the creation 
of village savings and improved agriculture programs, 
like planting orchards and building greenhouses. The 
program-within-a-program of the SWA, and the building 
up of women’s leadership that this entailed, has been 
credited with significantly changing women’s roles in 
rural society; with inspiring them to participate in village 
life; and with possibly having a long-term effect on such 
markers of women’s empowerment as increased school 
enrollment for girls.6
In turn, studies of the Saemaul Undong, as well as 
observers at the time, have in many cases highlighted the 
idea that women’s participation was a critical driver for 
the success of Saemaul Undong. The notion that women 
worked harder than men to carry out the Saemaul 
Undong is widespread, and contemporary publications 
praised their “iron-willed” determination. Indeed, the 
governor of Jeonlabugdo commented that in his view the 
Saemaul Undong was led by women.
Yet this effort was not without challenges. This case 
study examines how women’s leadership was promoted 
and integrated into Saemaul Undong, and some of the 
delivery challenges that it faced during the course of that 
process. The parameters of the program were determined 
by national-level policy makers, but given the locally-led 
5 Han and Claasen 2017.
6 Seo 2019. 
nature of village development projects in the Saemaul 
Undong, experiences varied widely, as each village—and 
each local Saemaul Women’s Association—attempted to 
implement experiments at the local level. Thus, while the 
program-within-a-program of women’s empowerment 
was promoted by national authorities, it was ultimately the 
women themselves, working with persistence within the 
specific contexts of their villages, who ensured the success 
of the Saemaul women’s programs at the village level. 
And women seized the opportunity to promote their 
own agency within village life. The Saemaul Undong 
combined a top-down and bottom-up structure, in 
which the state provided guidance and some resources 
for villagers to use, while also providing broad leeway for 
villagers to choose and implement their own projects. 
This in turn opened a window of opportunity for women 
to improve their standing in public life. 
Development Challenge: Rural 
Development and Women’s 
Empowerment 
The goal of the Saemaul Undong was to reduce rural 
poverty, improve living standards in the countryside, and 
reduce the gaps in wealth between Korea’s booming cities 
and lagging villages. Almost 60 percent of the population 
of South Korea lived in rural areas, and almost 28 percent 
(more than 5.5 million people) of these households lived 
in absolute poverty – unable to fully meet basic needs. 
Testimonies from the time period attest to significant 
deprivation, to the point of many households lacking 
sufficient food and entire villages suffering from spring 
food shortages.7 Houses typically had thatched roofs 
and lacked electricity; basic infrastructure was in poor 
condition, and agricultural productivity was low. 
The primary motivation of increasing women’s 
participation was largely as a means to contribute to 
the goals of local development and poverty reduction. 
Women were motivated to seize initiative and participate 
in the Saemaul Undong by the promise of a better life (the 
slogan of “living well” or “a campaign for a better life” was 
a rhetorical through line for the Saemaul Undong).8 This 
perspective is congruent with arguments for women’s 
7 Han and Classen 2017. “Poverty is my enemy.”
8 See, for example, author interview with Munja Chung, as well as presidential 
speeches accessed in the GRICKS archive. 
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equality and empowerment that argue that progress in 
this area is a good thing in and of itself, and that it would 
accelerate development.9 Legal equality for men and 
women, leading to equal participation of women and men 
in economic life, both increases women’s ability to make 
the right choices for their households and communities 
and “is ... associated with improved economic outcomes” 
(World Bank 2020). One study of this period asserted 
that the program would be unable to make progress if 
“half the villagers”— that is, the women of the village—
were excluded from development projects.10 
Yet, if women’s effective participation and leadership 
was necessary to allow Saemaul Undong to achieve its 
goals, women (and the women’s program) would need to 
overcome entrenched traditions that relegated women 
to subordinate roles within the household and in public 
life. Strong Confucian and patriarchal norms meant that 
women were subject to the dictates of fathers, husbands 
(and fathers-in-law), and male authority figures within 
the home. Under Korea’s family law (1960-1991), women 
could not become legal heads of household, and faced 
many other discriminatory provisions. Despite formally 
equal access to schooling, educational opportunities for 
women were typically restricted. And despite provision 
for legal equality under the Republic of Korea’s 1948 
constitution, women were effectively excluded from most 
leadership roles in government at the national level and 
in their communities.11 This experience of confronting 
the challenge of resistance to women’s participation—
in political and civic leadership, economic opportunity, 
and public life—resonates with the contemporary 
development challenge of greater gender equality.12
Delivery Challenges
At the village level, as the government moved to put the 
Saemaul Undong program in place and to deepen women’s 
participation within it, a number of delivery challenges 
(that is, obstacles impeding effective implementation or 
operation of the program) emerged. 
9 In a seminal paper, Duflo (2012) surveys the relationship between women’s 
empowerment and development. See also Devadas and Kim 2020.
10 Han 2012. 
11 Until fairly recently, the exceptions that exist were largely of the kind that prove 
the rule, such as the public roles played by a handful of female heroes of the 
struggle for national independence. 
12 See Devadas and Kim 2020; Chawla et al. 2017; and Domingo et al. 2015.
Social and Cultural Issues: Gender
Increasing women’s participation and empowering them 
within the household and within public life meant that the 
women themselves would need to confront deeply-rooted 
social and cultural norms.13 Winning over community 
members who were opposed to women’s empowerment 
and leadership was a crucial step in establishing women’s 
leadership and effectively advancing the proposed 
projects of the SWAs. 
Multiple documents assessing women’s participation 
in Saemaul Undong quote the popular proverb “It goes 
ill for the house when the hen sings and the rooster goes 
silent” to illustrate prevailing attitudes toward gender 
roles. In essentially claiming that women should be quiet 
and not seek to voice complaints or elevate themselves, 
these attitudes emphasized women’s subordinate position 
to men within the household and, by extension, in 
politics and public life.14 Indeed, women who were active 
in women’s projects of the Saemaul Undong reported 
having this proverb quoted to them by fellow villagers and 
even their own family members as an argument against 
their participation in development and empowerment 
projects.15 
Skills and Organizational Capacity 
Organizational capacity for the newly-created Saemaul 
women’s groups was an important issue.  Many women 
were poorly educated or illiterate. This posed a barrier 
to activities like record-keeping and keeping accounts for 
income-generating projects. 
Opposition and Lack of Consensus
The problem most frequently encountered by Saemaul 
women’s leaders was a lack of support from other women 
in the community. At first, interest was low in taking on 
additional responsibilities, since women already typically 
had a heavy workload within their households.  
Increasing engagement within the village groups 
would be challenging. As the movement grew and 
organizations became more complex, interpersonal 
13 Assessing the delivery challenges that impeded women’s participation presents 
an interesting exercise in one particular aspect—that is, the extent to which 
the category of development challenge of advancing gender equality or 
women’s empowerment overlapped with the analytical category of the “delivery 
challenge”—that is, deeply-rooted resistance to that very goal.
14 See Min Young Seo 2018; and Chung, Moon, and Lee 2013. 
15 Chung, Moon, and Lee 2013.  
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conflict within these groups—disagreement over what 
kinds of projects to pursue and over who should get the 
credit—could also pose a challenge to the cohesiveness 
of the local SWAs. Testimonies from the period indicate 
that the effectiveness of the groups was in some cases 




In 1970, president Park Chung Hee launched the Saemaul 
Undong program in a speech to provincial governors. 
Park made clear that modernization of South Korea’s 
villages was a major priority for his government. Park, 
who took power in 1963, came from a rural background 
himself, and his familiarity with the problems of South 
Korea’s rural villages presumably contributed to his keen 
interest in and promotion of this project.16 
President Park laid out principles for this movement, 
stressing a need for both dedication by local officials and 
cooperation and self-help among villagers. The three 
cardinal values driving Saemaul Undong were presented 
as diligence, self-help, and cooperation, signaling the 
perceived importance of villagers working together to 
improve their own villages (ADB 2012). The program 
stressed that villages would receive some help from the 
national government, including provision of building 
materials and supplies, but that the villagers themselves 
would need to organize themselves, select projects, and 
provide significant inputs of labor and funds to improve 
infrastructure, income, and living standards. 
Park conceived of Saemaul Undong as a movement 
for spiritual renewal—not merely a project to raise 
standards of living, but one whose success depended on 
moral fortitude and overcoming what were, to an extent, 
viewed as a defeatist mindset and backwards customs.17 
From the beginning of the Saemual Undong, Park took 
a strong personal interest in it. He received monthly 
reports on the program and even personally composed 
an anthem for the program (this anthem was performed 
at village meetings and group project gatherings). 
Project implementation began later in 1970, with the 
provision of basic materials (cement and rebar) to villages 
16 See Oh 2018.
17 ADB 2012; Sonn and Gimm 2013. 
across South Korea. National authorities provided a list of 
recommended projects (largely infrastructural in nature), 
and stipulated that villages should select the projects to 
implement through village assemblies. Participation was 
not officially mandatory, and villages were in theory free 
to choose whatever projects they wanted—although they 
tended to choose the kinds of projects recommended by 
the government. 
While the national government provided material 
inputs and moral suasion, and made decisions about 
how the program as a whole would be administered, 
villages had broad leeway to choose the kinds of projects 
they would implement. Implementation activities of 
Saemaul Undong took place at multiple levels. Inputs 
and encouragement emanated from the national level, 
while decentralized implementation of myriad small 
local projects was carried out in rural villages across 
Korea. The Saemaul Undong thus combined top-down 
and bottom-up aspects.18 The same would be true of the 
women’s projects.
Increasing Women’s Participation 
At the inception of the SMU, women’s activity 
mainly consisted of contributing labor for small-
scale infrastructure projects. Many men in rural areas 
opposed even this relatively limited degree of agency. 
While President Park referred in speeches to the idea 
that women’s active participation in SMU would improve 
their status, this did not automatically translate into 
participation, nor into a focus on women’s issues. 
The first group of SMU village leaders was made up of 
men. These popularly elected community representatives 
were in charge of mobilizing villagers and overseeing the 
implementation of projects, with the post held separately 
from that of the salaried “village head.”19 The Ministry 
of Home Affairs established this arrangement in part to 
emphasize the spirit of voluntarism that was assumed to 
drive the SMU.  
In 1972, the Ministry of Home Affairs’ efforts to evaluate 
and adapt the program were ongoing, following the 
somewhat experimental launch of the Saemaul Undong 
(Han 2017). Early that year, the Ministry established the 
Saemaul Undong Leaders Training Institute, and began 
18 See Park 2009.
19 The village head was a paid, male-dominated position with a long history in 
Korean rural life, whose main task was typically to represent the interests of his 
village before sub-county authorities and to liaise with those authorities.  
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to bring SMU leaders together for training courses. 
These trainings focused on instilling “Saemaul spirit” 
and teaching effective management techniques, along 
with site visits to successful projects and discussions 
to inculcate best practices for implementation of SMU 
projects (ADB 2012; Han 2017).
From their work on the first wave of SMU projects, 
these SMU leaders perceived that women were highly 
motivated to participate in the Saemaul Undong, and 
the relatively young and forward-looking cadre that 
predominated among the SMU leaders believed the 
program would benefit from women’s participation.20 The 
leaders observed the women’s role in keeping households 
running and promoting the well-being of their families. For 
these reasons, male leaders urged greater participation of 
women as SMU leaders in their post-training evaluations.21 
This was echoed by some of the trainers and agricultural 
experts who were at that time fanning out across the 
countryside to deliver leadership trainings.22
Faced with the need to effectively mobilize women 
in the villages, and with male village leaders raising the 
issue themselves, the Ministry of Home Affairs adjusted 
the program so that each village’s Saemaul Association 
would have a male and female SMU leader. These leaders 
would be co-equal, but women would focus on specific 
sets of projects, and on catalyzing the empowerment 
and participation of women. This dual leadership system 
catalyzed increased participation by women on SMU 
projects that responded to their specific needs and gave 
them leadership roles within their communities. 
The first batch of female SMU leaders received 
training in June, 1973. In the following year, the “Saemaul 
Undong for Women”component of the program was 
launched and Saemaul Women’s Associations (SWAs) 
began to be formed.23 
Establishing the Saemaul Women’s 
Associations: Building on the Foundation 
of Preexisting Women’s Organizations 
The SWAs built on preexisting traditions of women’s 
organizations in South Korean villages, leveraging the 
20 Interview with Gab-Jin Chung, 2019. On the relative youth of the SMU leaders, 
and their presumed progressive views, see Han 2012, and Sonn & Gimm 2013. 
21 Interview with Gab-Jin Chung, 2019. 
22 These trainings focused on instilling “Saemaul spirit,” as well as site visits and 
discussions to inculcate best practices for implementation of SMU projects (ADB 
2012). 
23 Chung, Moon, and Lee 2013.
existing capacity of these organizations to implement 
Saemaul Undong projects, and drawing on their 
membership to create the SWAs.24 Ultimately, in fact, the 
SWAs would subsume most of these preexisting village-
level institutions. 
By the late 1950s, government-sponsored organizations 
had begun to be established in in rural villages, with the 
aim of advancing local development. One such set of 
organizations was the Life Improvement Clubs, which 
were overseen by the Organization of Rural Agricultural 
Development of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries. 
The Life Improvement Clubs were set up and supervised 
by a female agricultural extension worker, referred to as 
a Guidance Officer. The primary focus of these clubs was 
on organizing women to facilitate behavior change and 
improvements in health, nutrition, and living conditions. 
These clubs spread rapidly throughout the 1960s. By 
1976—two years into the establishment of the SWAs—
there were 28,371 village Life Improvement Clubs, with 
34,803 guidance officers overseeing them. The program had 
become diversified to include education on child health, 
food processing and preservation, home management and 
various non-farm income-producing techniques, as well 
as a number of other types of projects. 
Another important set of women’s organizations 
were the Mothers Clubs—perhaps the most emblematic 
Korean women’s organizations. This program also began 
in 1958, and were set up as twelve-person groups drawn 
from village catchment areas. Members of the Clubs 
were originally required to be literate mothers between 
20 and 45 years old. 
A core focus of the Mothers Clubs was family 
planning to fight poverty and improve women’s health. A 
combination of narrow focus and restricted membership 
contributed to their success, as they were able to convince 
villagers to take part in family planning campaigns. They 
also became incubators for building women’s leadership; 
the leaders of the Mothers Clubs were more likely to be 
literate, which later helped many of them become leaders 
of their local SWAs.25 
Between 1973 and 1977, this constellation of 
organizations worked in alignment with the broader 
Saemaul Undong strategy, coexisting and to some extent 
24 For example, traditional revolving credit unions (KYE) provided a base for local 
savings programs. 
25 Both simultaneously—heading both the SWA and the Mothers Club—and 
leading the SWA after the absorption of other women’s organizations by the 
SWA in 1977. 
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coordinating. As the Saemaul Undong continued to be 
implemented, with the active participation of the Saemaul 
Women’s Association, the government saw the profusion 
of women’s organizations as causing potential confusion 
and contradictions in policy. In July of 1977, a government 
decree consolidated the Life Improvement Club, Mothers 
Club, and other rural women’s organizations into the 
Saemaul Women’s Association. Activities previously 
carried out by other women’s organizations were taken 
over by the Saemaul Women’s Association, and the 
SWA created departments to cover these functions.26 
Moreover, as all rural women between the ages of 20 
and 60 years old were required to become members of 
the expanded Saemaul Women’s Association, the SWA 
absorbed the membership of these organizations. This in 
turn had an effect on the leadership cadre: about a third 
of the SWA village leaders after this merger were drawn 
from the leadership of the Mothers Clubs. 
Setting up village-level projects 
The kinds of projects put in place by the SWAs differed 
widely from village to village, but there were common 
patterns. Programs included the creation of savings 
groups and income generating projects; the establishment 
of local community stores and markets; communal 
kitchens; daycares and nurseries; and participation 
in temperance and anti-gambling campaigns. These 
projects typically started small (for example, saving a 
scoop of rice) and scaled up later as a way to minimize 
opposition within the village.
Savings programs and income-generating 
projects 
This project was found in virtually every village and 
almost all the SWA members participated. The original 
idea was to save a scoop of rice per person at every meal 
before cooking. This could then be sold, and the proceeds 
deposited with a credit union or with the local Agricultural 
Cooperative Branch Bank collectively. The funds from 
these savings were then used to fund SWA activities. 
The SWAs also organized additional projects for 
fundraising purposes, including paid public work and 
producing items for sale. Funds raised were then used 
26 For example, the SWA became instrumental in the family planning activities 
previously covered by the Mothers Clubs (Moon 2005; Chung, Moon, and Lee 
2013). 
for the mutual benefit of all the participating families or 
the whole community. This might include purchasing 
communal kitchen utensils, payment of taxes, or social 
gatherings for village elders. 
If the central goal of the Saemaul Undong was to 
produce a better life, income-generating and agriculture-
diversifying projects played a central role. These varied 
widely based on the village and the region. A partial list 
of projects taken on in the village of Oryu-ri included 
the planting of chestnut trees, cultivation of raspberries, 
planting of soybeans to make soymilk, digging a pond to 
raise fish, and cattle-raising. These measures produced 
profits that could be reinvested or used for other purposes 
(for example, profits from the chestnut tree planation 
were used to fund scholarships for village children).27 
Moreover, as women generated income for 
themselves, this increased their economic power within 
their households.  
Community stores (and local markets)
The second most popular SWA project was the institution 
of a community store. Many villages that were located 
far away from marketplaces set up a store that carried 
various commodities necessary for daily life. This meant 
that women would not have to make a long trip to a 
far-away market. It also was seen as a means of keeping 
money in the community, rather than spending money 
in another town. By 1979, there were 24,891 such stores 
across South Korea. 
Communal kitchen 
Many villages organized a collective cooking and serving 
system for both the male and female farmers during 
the planting and harvesting seasons, when women’s 
labor was most needed to supplement that of the men. 
It was seen as a modern version of the older custom of 
villagers participating in a labor-pooling arrangement for 
agricultural tasks (e.g., sowing, transplanting, or harvest). 
In 1979, there were 6,000 communal kitchens operating in 
the country. Sometimes, the operation of the communal 
kitchen was also used to raise funds for the SWA. 
Daycare centers
The establishment of nurseries or community daycare 
centers systematized common practices of caring for 
27 Chung, Moon, and Lee 2013. 
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neighbors’ children with one’s own. This more-organized 
provision of child care enabled women to work and 
participate in community activities. It was reported that 
there were 10,304 daycare centers in 1979. 
Temperance and Anti-Gambling Campaigns 
In many villages, the strong moral tone of the Saemaul 
Undong extended to campaigns against gambling 
and drunkenness. This complicated social issue was 
deeply intertwined with questions of local development 
and poverty. Particularly during winter seasons of 
unemployment, heavy drinking and gambling were 
common, as were stories of heads of household gambling 
away their family’s belongings. Alcohol abuse contributed 
to domestic violence, and was viewed as a contributor to 
unproductive spending. And gambling and drinking tended 
to go together, with gambling taking place in taverns. 
Many women (who typically did not enter these male 
spaces) considered drinking and gambling to be a major 
contributor to the poverty of their households.28 In many 
villages, the local Saemaul Women’s Association was 
an enthusiastic contributor to the temperance and anti-
gambling component of the Saemaul Undong Movement, 
which aimed to increase household savings rates.29 They 
did this in a variety of ways. In some cases, women 
burned playing cards, or burst into the taverns where 
their husbands were gambling to confront them in public. 
In others, they gave their support to local temperance 
advocates, galvanizing village assemblies to close down 
“problematic tavern(s).”30 And in still others they advocated 
for restrictions on the kinds or quantities of alcohol 
available, mandating that local community stores only sell 
small bottles of liquor, to encourage moderation.  
Addressing Delivery 
Challenges 
While Saemaul Women’s Associations achieved a wide 
variety of results, it was not a quick or easy process. They 
would have to overcome a set of delivery challenges, 
28 See Han 2012. 
29 It may be worth noting that this was not, per se, a prohibitionist movement, but 
a nuanced issue. Some women’s organizations advocated the sale of alcoholic 
beverages in local markets, as a way of keeping money in the community and 
encouraging the consumption of liquor in the allegedly more wholesome setting 
of the home. Income-generating activities also included the production of wine 
(e.g., from raspberries). 
30 Han 2012. 
manifesting largely at the village level and in ways shaped 
by the context of those particular villages and interventions. 
While the circumstances of particular villages varied 
considerably, a few recurring challenges were particularly 
common. If the Saemaul Undong, including its gender 
component, resembled “an array of experiments,” then part 
of the process of experimentation would be tackling the 
particularities of these delivery challenges as they emerged.
Social and Cultural Issues: Gender
Within many rural villages, women’s activities in support 
of the Saemaul Undong faced enormous suspicion and 
resistance from people opposed to women assuming 
greater public roles. Women who undertook public 
activities risked censure from their families, and even 
physical assault; for example, when members of one SWA 
attempted to establish a Korean folk band as a fund-raising 
activity, they were attacked with sticks by outraged elders.31 
Many of the female Saemaul leaders adopted a strategy 
of, essentially, charm and patient persuasion to wear 
down the resistance of suspicious elders and recalcitrant 
in-laws. It was important to win over members of the 
village who felt they might have the most to lose from 
women’s empowerment. Without the ability to resort to 
more-explicit legal mandates, this slower and delicate 
approach was seen as the best option available. 
One strategy for winning over resistant family 
members was for the SWA to organize a short trip and 
a special meal for the daughter in-law and the elders 
that she needed to persuade. This display of care helped 
the group gain credibility and trust from the elderly.32 
Another tactic that some female leaders used was to 
prepare a monthly feast for all the elders of the village. 
This was a way to demonstrate their good faith and 
respect for this influential group within the village, and 
demonstrated that SWA’s activities would benefit the 
village as a whole.33 This slow strategy of cajoling paid 
dividends when, for example, groups of older women 
were convinced by their daughters-in-law to support the 
family planning activities of the Mothers Clubs.34 
31 This is not the only reference to women being attacked with sticks to appear in 
the literature on the establishment of the Saemaul Women’s Associations. 
32 Interview with Gab-Jin Chung, 2019. 
33 Interview with Gab-Jin Chung, 2019. 
34 Initially, there was resistance even to discussion of family planning. One 
interview explained that initially this was associated with “women’s liberation,” 
a term that at the time had negative connotations. Yet ultimately, even in 
particularly conservative areas, tactics of showing extra respect for elders and 
preparing meals for them was seen producing success. 
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Women’s group members also shared stories of using 
humor to disarm their interlocutors. One female leader, 
Hong Young Mae, had to convince an influential elder to 
support a water pipe project in the village. This would 
make a significant difference for women, who were often 
charged with bringing water for household needs. In an 
interview, she explained: 
I asked “Elder! Do you think it is right that it goes 
ill with the house where the hen sings when the 
rooster is silent?”
When the notable answered that he did indeed feel 
that way, Mae countered by saying that she had begun 
to keep chickens, and that their eggs were bringing in 
a profit—but that when the noisy rooster crowed, he 
knocked over a tile and broke the eggs. The elder laughed, 
warmed to her, and ultimately agreed to support the 
water project.35 
Another strategy that some women leaders used to 
deal with opposition to women’s participation was to 
open discussion of complaints and potential suggestions 
in village assemblies and meetings. While this entailed 
considerable patience in some cases, and in effect putting 
up with suspicions and accusations of corrupting village 
life, it also slowly won over reluctant villagers.36 To 
demonstrate that they were operating the SWA activities 
transparently, some groups shared their accounting with 
weekly village assemblies.
Skills and Organizational Capacity 
Organizational capacity for the newly-created Saemaul 
women’s groups was an important issue.  Many women 
were illiterate, which posed a barrier to activities like 
keeping accounts for income-generating projects. 
SWAs and Ministry implementers saw training as the 
answer to these issues of capacity. Some of the women’s 
group leaders who were literate gave classes in reading 
and math to their counterparts during the evenings. 
In some cases university students, pastors, and other 
better-educated villagers contributed their time to this 
exercise.37 The SMU training centers also played a key 
role, offering classes in vital skills (e.g., bookkeeping).38 
35 Chung, Moon, and Lee 2013. 
36 Chung, Moon, and Lee 2013. 
37 Interview, Gab-Jin Chung, 2019.
38 Group interview at GRIKS, 2019. 
At a more strategic level, the trainings focused on 
learning from successful cases, in which trainers presented 
a successful SMU project from another community and 
then facilitated a group discussion. These were well-
received by the women who participated in discussions 
of successful cases, with one former trainer making the 
point that this was the most inspirational aspect of the 
curriculum.39 
Because the government lacked the capacity to 
bring leaders from all over a given county (gun), a more 
dispersed training program was instituted. SMU training 
programs (for both men and women) were set up in 
government agencies in sub-county offices. This allowed 
for a broader reach of training.40 
Opposition and Lack of Consensus
Even once the SWAs were set up, internal debates, 
feuds, and envy could easily pose a threat to the effective 
operation of the groups. In these small groups, even 
minor interpersonal disputes could become a significant 
problem. 
There were power struggles among members of the 
SWAs over issues of prestige and transparency. Frequent 
topics of dissent included debates over leadership, 
who would hold the key position of bookkeeper, and 
transparency with funds raised. To deal with these issues, 
the Saemaul Leadership Training Institute introduced 
curricula on bookkeeping, conflict resolution, and 
transparency. Still, the individual diplomacy of Saemaul 
leaders was often an important factor. 
The experiences of Munja Chung, whose work for 
the Mothers Club and SWA in the village of Oryu-
ri were showcased by the Ministry of Home Affairs as 
a prominent example of the so-called Saemaul spirit, 
provided an illustrative example of the delicacy required 
to defuse tensions in the sometimes-charged settings of 
the local SWAs (as well as of the way that the government 
used these stories to disseminate presumed best 
practices). Munja Chung’s efforts to institutionalize the 
SMU in her home village were extensively documented 
by the Ministry. As she became more famous and was 
invited to speak about her experiences and discuss the 
success story of her village, other members of the Oryu-ri 
SWA and Mother’s Club felt that their own work was not 
being adequately recognized. Other core members even 
39 Interview with Kimyung, 2019. 
40 Interview with Gab-Jin Chung, 2019. 
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threatened to resign from the group. This would have 
been a significant blow to Oryu-ri’s SMU initiatives, and 
Munja Chung took actions to salve hurt feelings within 
the group.41 
This included the organization of a one year anniversary 
ceremony for the project, at which other members were 
honored (Chung solicited special certificates from the 
governor to give as prestigious awards).42 Chung also 
shared the payments that she received for her speaking 
tour with the group, donating them to the Mothers Club 
to avoid the appearance of inappropriately benefitting 
from her status.43
Also, internal conflicts occurred over management of 
the group fund. At that time, opening a bank account was 
a rare thing for most local villagers. Having the account 
in her name, however, raised issues of transparency and 
favoritism. To avoid the appearance of favoritism, she 
made the account book accessible for all members. That 
transparency helped diminish the internal conflicts.44
Reflecting on Results (Short- 
and Long-term) and Lessons 
from the SWA Experience  
By 1980, the Ministry of Home Affairs counted 64,902 
Saemaul Women’s Associations in rural areas. These 
organizations had become institutionally more firmly 
established, and had won greater acceptance at the 
community level. In a nation-wide study of SMU in 1980, 71 
percent of respondents reported feeling positively about the 
women’s contribution.45 Another study of women’s Saemaul 
activities reported that 92 percent of respondents agreed 
that women contributed very much or to some extent to 
community development.46 The Saemaul Undong was 
regarded as a driver of both material improvement and moral 
renewal in the countryside, and women’s contributions were 
seen as indispensable drivers of this impact. 
Douglass (2015) asserted that many factors made 
the Saemaul Undong unique: the nature of the regime, 
the particular historical juncture (in which the SMU 
41 Interview with Munja Chung, 2019. 
42 Chung, Moon, and Lee 2013.
43 Interview with Munja Chung, 2019.
44 Interview with Mrs. Chung, 2019. 
45 In-Joung Whang, Hanguk ui Chonghap Nonchon Kaebal: Saemaul Undong Ui 
Pyongga wa Chonmang (Intergreated Rural Development in Korea; Evaluation 
and Prospect of SU) (Seoul: Korean Rural Development Institute, 1980) p.99
46 Yun-Seook Lee, et. al. op. cit., p 72
represented a “bridge” between a postcolonial wave of 
community development projects and later practices of 
sector-focused development), as well as its coinciding in 
time with the Green Revolution (the set of agricultural 
technologies introduced in the 1950s and 1960s), which 
helped raise agricultural productivity in its own right. 
Thus, “lessons of the Saemaul Undong are historically 
bounded and contextually contingent.”47 
Given the distance from its origins—almost half 
a century—and the way in which memories and 
interpretations are colored by the passage of time, it may 
be difficult to draw clear conclusions about the “how” of 
effective implementation. Moreover, as values shift, they 
also shift our interpretations of what lessons can be derived 
from a given case. While the work of the SWAs was clearly 
important to the SMU, their impact on broader issues of 
women’s empowerment in Korea is less clear, and certainly 
difficult to quantify. Despite all these caveats, there are 
lessons and tentative policy implications that can be drawn 
from this case. It may start with the inspiring example of 
fortitude and persistence shown by rural women who, in 
very difficult circumstances, worked tirelessly to create a 
better life for themselves, for their families, and for their 
communities. In addition, this experience has lessons 
for the way we think about working within the complex 
social and political worlds of rural village life, for how we 
think about building on preexisting capacity, and about 
the political commitment necessary for ensuring durable 
women’s empowerment. As such, the case study offers 
some lessons, or points of reflection, for development 
interventions and reforms that aim to increase women’s 
participation. These speak both to the possibilities and the 
limitations of such projects. 
Building on preexisting organizational 
structures
The Saemaul Women’s Associations were not formed 
from whole cloth, but built on and benefitted from 
preexisting organizations that helped give them a head 
start in terms of capacity and leadership. Techniques 
employed by female Saemaul leaders—such as the slow 
processes of gentle persuasion to win over conservative-
minded elders and in-laws—were pioneered by the 
Mothers Clubs. The SWAs drew membership and 
leadership from these organizations and benefitted from 
47 Douglass 2015. 
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their decades of experience. This suggests that initiatives 
aiming to achieve durable social change may benefit from 
building on antecedents and previously-existing forms of 
organization. 
Working with the (Micro-)Politics 
A number of recent publications enjoin development 
practitioners to “work with the grain” and “think and 
work politically.”48 This is meant to drive home the point 
that development is a fundamentally political process. 
This would likely come as no surprise to the women of the 
SWAs, who, in pursuing economic development as well 
as empowerment inside and outside the home, showed a 
keen awareness of the political dynamics of their villages. 
This is a suggestive example of what these processes look 
like in practice at a very local level, and within a bounded 
historical scope: the small, complex, world of Korea’s 
rural villages in the 1970s. This is an example of what 
some scholars refer to as “micro-politics”—collective 
dynamics and the practices of politics within small 
groups of individuals.49
Practices of working with these micro-politics 
included the strategic cultivation of influential elders; the 
patient approach that this cultivation took, particularly 
within the often very conservative units of the family; 
and knowing when to reach out to officials for help.50 
This work also showed how interpersonal dynamics in 
relatively small—and even highly motivated—teams can 
threaten to derail projects, and the adaptiveness needed 
to deal with this. And it illustrates well how the political 
and the personal can intertwine. Often, the first person 
that a woman needed to convince to facilitate (or at least 
not hinder) her participation in village life was her own 
husband.51
48 While the particulars of such approaches differ, they share a broad standpoint 
that politically-informed ways of working, driven by a keen understanding of 
local dynamics and moving beyond one-size-fits-all notions of best practice, 
ultimately enable development practitioners to work more effectively. For 
example, Laws and Marquette (2018) suggest that development work may 
become more effective through the practice of “thinking and working politically.” 
Levy (2014) argues that governance practitioners may need to “work with the 
grain” of politics in order to have tangible impact in their sector. And Wild and 
Foresti (2013) assert that service delivery, particularly for the poor, may need to 
“work with the politics.” This way of working may also enable practitioners to 
work more adaptively (see Andrews, Pritchett, and Woolcock; Green 2016; and 
Faustino and Booth 2015).
49 See, for example, King (2004) and McAreavey (2006).
50 For example, at a critical juncture—when members of her village were feeling 
particularly discouraged—Mrs. Chung reached out to a local governor to ask him for 
help encouraging members of the village to pursue their SMU projects, and solicited 
his help in getting her proposed project—a chestnut tree plantation—started.  
51 Interview with Munja Chung, 2019. 
The Importance of Patience and Long-term 
Political Commitment in Social Reforms
One of the apparent ironies of the Saemaul Women’s 
Association was that, for all the local acclaim that the 
program received, it did not lead to an immediate 
dramatic change in women’s representation or political 
power at the national level. Writing in 1993, two decades 
after the institution of the Women’s Saemaul Undong, 
Kyung Ae Park lamented that women were largely shut 
out of national political life.52 What women achieved, 
including real changes in terms of ability to participate at 
the village level, were not scaled up into larger strategies 
for women’s empowerment within society as a whole, and 
channels were not necessarily opened for greater political 
participation. Thus, with the program circumscribed at 
the village level, the gains in women’s status that it may 
have achieved are difficult to quantify. In 2019, Korea 
had the highest gender wage gap in the OECD. And as 
the wide recognition of the feminist social novel Kim 
Jiyoung: Born 1982 makes poignantly clear, everyday 
sexism remains a live issue four decades after the women 
of the Saemaul Women’s Associations strove for greater 
participation in village life.
While a single big push on women’s empowerment 
and/or economic development is often implied to initiate 
a virtuous cycle of economic development and women’s 
empowerment, Duflo (2012) found that this was rarely the 
case. Rather, sustained growth in women’s empowerment 
requires a long-term political commitment; a big push for 
growth is not enough to make processes of empowerment 
self-sustaining. Thus, women’s empowerment remains 
of necessity a political project, with continued political 
commitment necessary to achieve lasting gains. 
After 1979, the SMU was pursued with considerably 
less vigor, although aspects of the program remained 
active.53 This may have weakened the impetus for 
continued empowerment of women at the village level.54 
Lasting gains for women, then, present a picture of 
slow and uneven progress, contingent and subject to a 
variety of social pressures. The gender ratio in births in 
the Republic of Korea (a proxy for gauging preference 
52 Park 1993. 
53 Indeed, the Saemaul Undong remains active as a program in countries ranging 
from Sri Lanka to Rwanda, as part of the Republic of Korea’s program of official 
development assistance. 
54 Douglass, 2015. It is worth noting, however, that under Park programs 
of empowerment were indeed sharply limited to the village level – this 
administration had no female cabinet members (Park 1993). 
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for male children) began to decline sharply in the 1990s. 
By the 2000s, the Republic of Korea led Asia in the 
rate of reduction for male child preference.55 The gap 
in educational attainment in primary, secondary, and 
tertiary education finally disappeared in this period.56 
Moreover, in terms of education, Seo (2018) finds an 
intriguing possible effect of women leaders in increasing 
the number of girls enrolled in schools. An increase in 
the cumulative number of female leadership trainees 
per district was associated with a statistically significant 
increase in the enrollment rate of girls in that district. [Seo 
posits that this is due to a role model effect, indicating 
that participation in the Saemaul Undong did, even if 
subtly, change women’s status and (self-) perceptions. 
55 Chung and Das Gupta 2007.
56 Seo 2018. 
It may also be worth noting that some individual 
women continued their careers as leaders after their 
participation in the SWAs. Munja Chung continued as 
a leader in the Saemaul Women’s Association until 1980. 
After this, she became a congresswoman for Pong Nab 
Dong County in Cheonbuk District. As of 2018, she 
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